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ABSTRACT. Recent evidence suggests that memory narratives are fallible cognitive and social con- 
structions. Yet, the literature lacks speczfic frameworks for guiding clinicians’ inquiry into such narra- 
tives. We propose one such framework that focuses on interpersonal memories. The model, which is 
based on Gibson? Theory of Perception as applied to the interpersonal domain, seeks a detailed database 
from which higher level clinical inferences can be derived. Case material is used to illustrate its 
application. The model is discussed in relation to recent research and controversy about psychotherapeutic 
memory, and a stance clinicians might take toward memory phenomena. 
Memories of specific interpersonal events in a client’s life are the grist for the psycho- 
therapeutic mill. Typically, these memories take the form of narratives (Bonanno, 1990; 
Bruner, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988; Sarbin, 1986; Spence, 1982) referencing interactions 
with significant others, usually loved ones, in the recent or distant past. As they emerge 
in psychotherapeutic conversations, such events are commonly understood in very limited 
ways and they have seldom been thought through in detail. Clients usually simply take 
them for granted as a part of their life story. Brewer (1986) calls memories of this sort 
personal memories, in that they involve the recollection of particular episodes in the 
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individual’s life. He notes that they: typically involve a sense of reliving the personal 
experience of the episode, almost always involve visual imagery, seem to reference a 
specific location in time and space, and are accepted by the person to be an accurate 
record of the experience. Such memories, in referencing single episodes, are distinguish- 
able from more generic autobiographic knowledge (e.g., “I grew up in a small town”) or 
schematized events based on repetition of an event pattern with minor variation (e.g., “I 
eat cereal for breakfast.“). In this paper interpersonal memories refer to personal memo- 
ries with interpersonal content. 
The problem for the clinician has long been how to understand interpersonal memories 
theoretically and practically. As dramatically illustrated in the recent controversy about 
Freud’s views of incest memories (Masson, 1984), this problem generally reduces to 
questions about how to ascribe truth value to memory narratives: are they representations 
of the realities of past episodes, distortions of these realities, productions of fantasy, or 
fallible reconstructions? Should the clinician focus on the manner in which the narrative 
is constructed or on the historical referent of the narrative? Whereas the position a 
clinician takes with respect to this epistemological problem can greatly influence the 
course of treatment (e.g., Loftus, 1993), specific practical guidance is rarely available. 
We address this problem by extending work begun by Safran and Greenberg (1988) in 
bringing together three theoretical lines: ecological perception theory (Gibson, 1966, 1979, 
1986), current cognitive theory (e.g., Neisser, 1976), and an interpersonal approach to therapy 
(e.g., Safran & Segal, 1990; Sullivan, 1953). In so doing we develop a guiding conceptual 
framework for the clinical investigation of interpersonal memories that both has a solid 
theoretical underpinning and clear practical applications. 
RECENT CLINICAL FORMULATIONS OF MEMORY 
In the past decade clinicians have paid increasing attention to the implications of cognitive 
psychology for clinical practice (e.g., Dickman & Sechrest, 1985; Guidano & Liotti, 1983; 
Mahoney, 1985; Mahoney & Gabriel, 1987; Turk & Salovey, 1985). Epistemological 
issues concerning memory narratives are central to this work. The overarching message 
has been that memory narratives are, at best, fallible representations of life episodes (e.g., 
Dickman & Sechrest, 1985; Orne, Whitehouse, Dinges, & Orne, 1988). Therefore, 
clinicians have focused almost exclusively on cognitive structure and process, attending 
more to how memory narratives are constructed than to the historical events they refer- 
ence. New cognitive tools for analyzing memories have been emphasized, such as schema 
theol-y (Neisser, 1976; Safran & Greenberg, 1988; Turk & Salovey, 1985), imagery (e.g., 
Klinger, 1978), and descriptions of cognitive and social construction processes (Gergen, 
1985; Guidano & Liotti, 1983). Moreover, there has been widespread acceptance of the 
notion, rooted in the sociology of knowledge (e.g., Berger & Luckman, 1966; Mannheim, 
1936), that scientific and clinical theories, are about, and are themselves, narrative con- 
structions (e.g., Bruner, 1986; Gergen, 1985; Sarbin, 1986) wherein meaning is socially, 
rather than objectively, legitimated. This thinking has encouraged clinicians to avoid 
viewing memories simply in terms of historical truth. 
More recently, consistent with a longstanding tradition linking interpersonal and cog- 
nitive perspectives (e.g., Carson, 1969; Sullivan, 1953), theorists have paid greater atten- 
tion to interpersonal process than in the past. Bonanno (1990), for example, draws on 
Spence’s (1982) distinction between narrative truth and historical truth to discuss how 
memory narratives can be understood as representations of important interpersonal 
themes in the individual’s life, thereby suggesting that historical accuracy is less relevant 
than traditionally thought. 
Even if memory narratives are constructions affected by cognitive and social processes, 
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as recent literature suggests, there remains the problem of how to respond to this material. 
When is a memory understood well enough? What aspects of the material should be taken 
as given, and what should be dealt with as interpreted? If all is interpreted, is there any 
meaningful sense in which the clinician can pursue the historical basis of the memory? 
Several authors have discussed the clinical consequences of this issue. Coyne and Gotlib 
(1983, 1986) caution that failure to acknowledge the accuracy of certain interpretations of 
interpersonal events may lead to difficulties in helping clients change problematic cogni- 
tions. Others (Rice, 1984; Safran 8t Greenberg, 1984; Safran & Segal, 1990) take an 
intermediate position on the epistemological issue, suggesting that investigation of memo- 
ries can reveal contextual and emotional information relevant to interpersonal process, in 
addition to interpersonal themes, that may have been present in the past and that might 
otherwise have been obscured in the narrative. Empirical evidence concerning the inci- 
dence of childhood physical and sexual abuse (Finkelhor, 1979), and the subsequent 
renewed interest in psychological trauma (e.g., van der Kolk, 1988) has alerted clinicians 
to the serious consequences of not accepting the truth value of certain memories. How- 
ever, in reviewing the enormous impact that the reemergence of trauma theory has had 
over the past decade, Loftus (1993) has expressed concern about the trend for clinicians, 
the public, and the legal system to over-identify and adjudicate sexual abuse based on the 
evidence of so-called repressed memories. Particularly compelling is the sizable body of 
empirical evidence suggesting that memories can be distorted and modified by a variety 
of situations, including the ways questions are asked about the event. This raises serious 
doubt about the extent to which event memory narratives represent authentic circum- 
stances in an individual’s life. Although caution is required in making causal attributions 
based solely on the evidence of a client’s memory-particularly in the legal context-the 
regularity with which clinicians deal with memories of all kinds, from the mundane to the 
dramatic, is unlikely to change in the near term. A specific operational framework is 
needed, beyond informal clinical lore, for interpreting how a specific narrative comes into 
the therapy and for dealing with fallible information in the assessment of historical events 
and cognitive structures. 
In considering this problem, it is important to maintain distinctions among: (a) the 
range of concerns identified in the memory literature that can render any particular 
memory narrative equivocal; (b) the adequacy of implicit models of interpersonal memo- 
ries that designate what, in principle, would be needed for them to be maximally identi- 
fied; (c) the technical problems various theoretical and empirical concerns raise for clinical 
inquiry. The literature on clinical memory has been much more strongly focused on (a), 
and has virtually ignored (b) and (c). Indeed, there have been no explicit attempts to 
identify the general properties of optimally informative memory narratives for different 
purposes. Rather, we have been mired in various versions of a long standing controversy 
between viewpoints that posit some vague notion of objective reality, versus those reject- 
ing any possibility of coordination between a memory narrative and events in the past. 
We believe this debate has developed to the point where more integrative alternatives are 
possible, although the problem becomes more complex than as originally framed. Next 
we address such an integration by proposing a heuristic tool that is consistent both 
with the literature on memory and with the realities clinicians and clients face in a 
psychotherapeutic inquiry. 
THE NEED TO EXAMINE THE PERCEPTIONS 
UNDERLYING INTERPERSONAL MEMORIES 
Because most memory narratives are naturally abstract and imprecise, one approach is to 
make them more concrete. This thinking is consistent with a long tradition in the clinical 
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literature supporting the exploration of memory detail (e.g., Loewald, 1976; MacKinnon 
& Michels, 1971; Safran & Segal, 1990; Sullivan, 1953). Schachtel(1949), for example, 
citing Proust’s (see Proust, 1982) f amous portrayal of childhood events evoked by the taste 
of a madeleine (an almond cookie), noted how recollections of the concrete trifles of 
childhood experience often evoke the larger surrounding emotional context as viewed 
from an adult perspective. Unlike Freud (1899/1989), who felt that such memories were 
a “screen” or concealment for underlying conflictual emotional states, Schachtel believed 
that the emotional conditions actually coexisting with the thing remembered could be 
discovered by careful inquiry. Concrete memories seemed to involve a condensation of 
emotional conditions existing in the past but not describable due to limitations of the 
client’s development and the cultural context of the remembered event. 
In addition, there are two lines of empirical support in recent cognitive literature 
suggesting that concretizing a memory might be a productive line of inquiry. First, in 
contrast to the literature cited earlier, it has been shown that individuals actually can 
attain higher levels of accuracy in eyewitness memories if they focus on the context and 
concrete details of an event (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985; Malpass 
& Devine, 1981). This is precisely the kind of detail found to be problematically identified 
in the eyewitness paradigm discussed by Loftus (1993). Second, Bucci’s (1989) work, 
based on Paivio’s (1990) memory model, suggests that clinical interpretations that include 
more concrete life details are more efficacious because they are more richly connected 
with the client’s experience. Nonetheless, despite these promising demonstrations, the 
work described by Loftus (1993) suggests that the fact of narrative detail, in itself, is 
insufficient grounds for establishing the truth value of the event described: such details 
may also be subject to distortions of fantasy, the context of the memory, and so on. Thus, 
a conceptual tool for analyzing memories must facilitate an understanding of both the 
details, and the various impressionistic and inferential observations one finds in a psycho- 
therapeutic memory narrative. 
To this end, our model pushes the notion of exploring the concrete to its logical extreme 
by focusing on the revelation of directly experienced perceptual detail. It is guided by a 
more precise conceptualization of interpersonal perception than has existed to date. The 
model is based on Gibson’s (1966, 1979, 1986) ecological model of perception, and a 
representation of the development and transformation of memories in real time. We use 
the terminology “real time” to emphasize the need for clinicians to attend carefully to the 
continuity, order, and directionality of time in the physical world (Hawking, 1988), even 
though there will be practical limitations on the extent to which this is possible. It is 
equivalent to the notion of proper time in physics (Bynum, Browne, & Porter, 1981). 
Proper time refers to an interval in the history of a material point as measured by an ideal 
clock moving along with the point. The measurement of proper time is invariant in 
space-time because all such clocks, moving along with the point, would achieve the same 
result. We are using a strict physical conception of time to emphasize that memories 
ultimately reference physical and subjective events that emerge within the continuous 
stream of a person’s experience. These events have invariant order and are, in a strict 
sense, not repeatable within the life span, even though narratives will only broadly 
reflect this structure. In contrast to more informally produced narratives, our formulation 
emphasizes the importance of detailed descriptions of basic perceptual information (e.g., 
what is being looked at moment to moment) and feeling states (e.g., tension, confusion, 
boredom, and so on) as they occurred. In effect, we seek a more fine-grained examination 
of the time stream (smaller time units) than one usually finds in narrative descriptions. 
We then consider these detailed events in light of the various interpersonal contexts for 
remembering occurring throughout an individual’s life. 
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This approach is consistent with recent views of memory narratives as complex social 
and cognitive constructions rather than as definitive portrayals. Nonetheless, we argue 
that some information conveyed in a memory narrative is more grounded in direct 
experience than other information. As such, specific measures can be taken to enhance 
one’s grasp of this groundedness without naively assuming that all narratives are definitive 
representations of authentic events, or conversely, that all narratives are equivalently 
distant from material experience. Our goal is to present one approach to the memory 
problem that we have found to enhance communication with clients and to make descrip- 
tions of historical events more precise. 
The exposition that follows consists of: (a) an overview of the guiding elements of 
Gibson’s ecological theory of perception, (b) a discussion of its specific application in the 
domain of interpersonal experience, (c) a discussion of the development of a memory 
narrative in real time that is implied by the theory, (d) clinical case illustrations, and 
finally (e) a general discussion of how this approach relates to various issues in the clinical 
memory literature. 
GIBSON’S ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PERCEPTION 
Why Gibson? 
Gibson’s (1966, 1979, 1986) theory of perception is a particularly fitting model for inter- 
preting perception in the interpersonal domain where events have considerable temporal 
extension. Traditionally, perception has been cast in terms either of objective properties 
of stimuli or of cognitive structures guiding attention and perception, but rarely are the 
two positions integrated. Furthermore, while time might be recognized as relevant in 
traditional theories, the explicit impact of the time’s directional arrow is often ignored. In 
contrast, the Gibsonian approach avoids such one-sided, static formulations by explicitly 
placing the relationship between the perceiver and the perceived in dynamic historical 
perspective. 
Perception in Ecological Context 
The Gibsonian, or “ecological,” position takes the entire matrix of the person embedded 
within physical space-time context into account. Gibson labored to show that perception 
involves the resonance to information that is in the world, not in the head (Gibson, 1979, 
1986; Reed, 1988). Thus, although higher cognitive processes are important, they are not 
needed for a theory of perception. But, for Gibson, this was not equivalent to an endorse- 
ment of stimulus theory, where the material aspects of the world are presumed to have 
normative properties perceptually available to all. Rather, he viewed perception as a 
function of the dynamic interplay between an acting perceiver and the thing perceived in 
an ongoing stream of time and motion. He developed the notion of direct perception, an 
active process in which the information registered is influenced by both its availability in 
the physical world and the goals and actions of the perceiver. 
McArthur and Baron (1983) have discussed how this position can be fruitfully applied 
to social and, hence, interpersonal perception. Interpersonal events are dynamic, provid- 
ing temporally organized information to the individual in the ways things remain the 
same with the other person (structural invariants) and in the ways they change and 
develop (transformational invariants). Gibson provides a tool for conceptualizing how 
information is perceived in the concept of uffordance. This concept refers to information in 
the perceptual field that is relevant to the perceiver’s action and goals; affordances are 
“action possibilities provided by an object” (McArthur & Baron, 1983, p. 217). For 
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example, a mother who feigns incompetence in catching a baseball is affording the possi- 
bility of a successful demonstration of skill, and hence enhanced confidence, for her son 
as he rushes to catch it before her. The ecological perspective forces us to consider the 
affordance possibilities of a relatively unique interpersonal field moving in space and 
time without assuming an objective stimulus or completely constructive operations. As 
McArthur and Baron point out, because affordances depend on the observer’s current 
actions and goals, they can change with different situations. With time, an observer 
can learn to attune to different affordances, even in seemingly identical circumstances. 
Nonetheless, from the ecological perspective, there must be supportive information avail- 
able in the invariant properties of the perceptual field, before such shifts in attention are 
possible. This has considerable implication for our conception of interpersonal events. If 
the mother in our example continued to feign incompetence with a baseball (a structural 
invariant) as her child became more familiar with his skills, the boy’s perceptions of 
similar actions may change; her action might come to afford more negative perceptions 
to her son, such as frustration with the difficulty in involving her in a game of catch (a 
description of a response to an affordance). But her true skills would not be perceived 
unless her feigning action is somehow revealed to him (e.g., she catches car keys with 
finesse at some later time-a transformational invariant). In turn, he would be unable to 
perceive her intention in the feigning action, an act of maternal kindness, without signili- 
cant development of his skills at interpersonal perception. 
Interpersonal Perception as the Historical Foundation of Interpersonal Memory 
From this perspective, the descriptions of events offered in most memory narratives are 
insufficient in that they rarely offer precise descriptions of the affordance structure operat- 
ing in the direct perception of the event. Yet, memories for events that had palpable 
existence are rooted in basic perceptual processes as they unfold in real time, even if this 
can be difficult to assess. For example, to say that one remembers someone in a room is 
not to say how this presence was perceived. Instead, one may actually have a visual image 
in mind in describing the presence, or something entirely different, such as hearing the 
person move while staring at a wall. 
To summarize, the Gibsonian position, in pointing to the effects of time on perception 
identifies several properties of events that are highly relevant to the retrospective exami- 
nation of interpersonal phenomena. First, information is neither the objective stimulus of 
traditional perception theory, nor is it completely a result of cognitive processing. Rather, 
information is locally specified in space and time in the affordance structure of the event. 
Second, information attunement is a real time operation dependent on, and to some 
extent bounded by, both properties of the event and properties of the perceiver. Third, 
any subsequent interpretations of the event, including all memorial reconstructions, how- 
ever abstract, find their origins in one or more perceived affordance structures locatable 
in space and time. As a result, the conceptual meanings expressed in subsequent memory 
narratives can be thought to have a foundation in the perceptual meaning of the original 
event referenced (cf. Shaw & Hazelett, 1986). A notion of historical truth can be mean- 
ingful in this theory but only in relation to specified properties of an observer and the 
affordance possibilities of the ecological field existing in space and time. The problem for 
the clinician becomes one of discerning the affordance structure of some distal event based 
solely on a proximal verbal interaction with the client. 
lmplica tions for Clinical Inquiry 
In this view, memory narratives are linguistic and interpersonal events in their own right 
involving some level of achievement in communicating about the affordance structure of 
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interpersonal events directly perceived in the past, and the understanding of those events 
that has evolved over the course of time since they took place. The reality they are 
presumed to reference is a perceptual reality that is limited by the ecological conditions 
prevailing at the time of the event; by post hoc cognitive and emotional processes, 
including transferential processes in therapy (e.g., Gill, 1982); and by other events not 
mentioned initially, such as reading a book that makes one think of the past in a different 
way (e.g.; Loftus, 1993). Thus, it is not a matter of the memory being fallible with respect 
to an external objective standard, nor of it being completely constructed, though both 
perspectives are useful in different contexts. Rather, in the context of the therapeutic 
focus on the individual’s own perceptual stream, there is no right or wrong, just various 
levels of achievement with respect to understanding, sharing, and integrating into one’s 
life story a real event, located in space and time, via linguistic representation. By implica- 
tion, some portion of a memory narrative is a purely linguistic interpretation of the event, 
and some portion maps information directly perceived in the past. The problem for the 
clinician becomes one of using narrative evidence to speculate about the perceptual course 
of interpersonal events in the past, and in so doing, to gain a better understanding of the 
prevailing ecological conditions referenced in the memory narrative. The point here is 
that all memory narratives, save perhaps those produced by a client who is purposefully 
lying, reference some aspect of the client’s experience-though that experience need not 
be of the event apparently referenced in the narrative-and in this sense the narrative is 
not right or wrong. Clinicians, on the other hand, as interpreters of this material, may 
erroneously jump to conclusions about the nature of events based on insufficient data or 
attend only to cognitive or social constructive operations and ignore the material and 
temporal constraints of the experience stream. In the next section, we present a model to 
facilitate an inquiry into interpersonal memories that is compatible with the real time 
complexity of events. 
A MODEL FOR EXPLORING THE ECOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF INTERPERSONAL MEMORY 
To illustrate the application of these ideas in a clinical context, consider a fairly typical 
example of an interpersonal memory embedded in a larger conversation. This memory 
emerged over several discussions with a 28-year-old man about his unhappiness at work. 
He offered an example from the past of his father “acting crazy.” He described how he had 
returned home with his father’s pickup truck from transporting goods to his college apart- 
ment. In so doing, he mistakenly placed a paint can in the back of the truck in such a way 
that it spilled. His father, always a stickler for responsible action, flew into a rage and began 
hastily cleaning the pickup box while screaming uncontrollably at his son. The young man 
described the mixture of fear, anger, and humiliation that accompanied his father’s “crazy” 
behavior, summarized in the phrase “Get me out of here.” 
Clinicians will recognize linkages between the recollection, the work situation, and 
even the therapeutic relationship itself. How can one examine the memory further? What 
follows is distinctive from traditional views of memory in two ways. First, ecological 
theory’s demands for strict representation of real time perceptual moments extends more 
deeply into the realm of sensory information than traditional approaches. Thus, a typical 
event narrative is not adequate from this perspective. Second, interpersonal events, and 
interpretations of those events, are seen to unfold in strict temporal order, the analysis of 
which is crucial to understanding how they inform interpersonal experience in the pres- 
308 S. J. Trierweiler and C. M. Donovan 
ent. As we will show, the examination of perceptual and interpersonal detail demanded 
by the model has important clinical payoff. 
INTERPERSONAL AFFORDANCE, PERCEPTION, AND 
RECOLLECTION IN REAL TIME 
Overview: The Omniscient Perspective 
In considering how ecological theory’s attention to time and motion informs remembering 
in the interpersonal domain, it is useful to imagine the perspective of an omniscient 
observer moving along with a client throughout his/her life span. Such an observer 
would have a fine grained awareness of the enduring behavioral and subjective qualities 
(invariants) of the client’s interactions and expertise in linking this material to later 
interpretations. This observer might portray the thousands of interpersonal interactions 
the client engages in as regions on a timeline in a two-dimensional space-time representa- 
tion. In this picture, an interaction could be represented by the convergence along the 
space dimension of the client’s timeline with that of another. Such convergences would 
extend along the time dimension until the particular interaction was over and the individ- 
uals left one another’s presence, perhaps to converge again at some later time. Among 
other things this representation would reveal that the specific events referenced in a 
memory narrative occupy a unique location on the two-dimensional space-time map. 
Additionally, the timeline would show the larger temporal context within which the event 
and its remembering occurred, and any other events, such as conversations with others, 
that reference the event. It would show that while interpretations of the event change with 
successive recollections, the event itself cannot be changed or reviewed because of its 
unique place back down the timeline. At a more microscopic level, it would reveal the 
precise details of the perceptions of each act as the event unfolded, as well as information 
about how the context of the interaction affected the event. Some of this material would 
not be available for self-report to the actors themselves even if the event were clearly 
remembered (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). If the observer were skilled at grasping how 
interpretations the person makes relate to the specifics of an event as perceived, then he/ 
she could generate a thorough understanding of how the client uses language and other 
events in life to interpret the past. (One would hope therapists would approximate such 
skilled meta observers were they able to review significant interpersonal events.) 
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a portion of such a space-time interaction map 
pertaining to the temporal ecology of one memory narrative. In the figure, time proceeds 
from left to right with the remembered event occupying the left side of the figure, and the 
therapy session in which it is recollected, the right side. The timeline for the client is the 
top portion of the figure, while portions of the timelines for other and the therapist are 
designated at the bottom. In this model, interpersonal memories identify the conjunction 
of two such timelines; client and other (other can be several others and social aggregates 
as well). The conjunction of these lines is typically a function of physical proximity in 
space and time, as shown by the lines coming together and moving apart as time proceeds 
from left to right. Each actor is represented by two lines identifying that actor’s continuous 
physical and subjective presences in time. Physical presence refers to all aspects of the 
physical being of the actor, including structure, appearance, motion, and overt verbal 
and nonverbal expression. Subjective presence refers to conscious subjective states that 
could, in principal, be verbalizable if the individual stopped and did so (e.g., Ericsson & 
Simon, 1984). 
This model shows that the act of generating a memory narrative references at least 
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FIGURE 1. A representation of the temporal lines of affordance, perception, 
and recollection of an interpersonal event in a therapy session. 
three sources of information: the affordance structure of the remembered event as it 
occurred in time (area A), one or more recollection events that might have occurred 
between the remembered event and the production of the narrative (area B), and the 
affordance structure of the therapy session in which the narrative is generated (area C). It 
outlines what a clinician might wish to know under ideal circumstances and reveals 
several important constraints on interpersonal perception, when viewed from an ecologi- 
cal perspective, that should be kept in mind in examining memory narratives. 
Interpersonal Perception is Continuous and Ordered 
First note that continuous lines are used to depict the subjective and physical presence of 
each individual. This emphasizes that a person’s physical being and perception are contin- 
uous and ordered in time despite our tendency to speak of events as discrete entities, often 
imprecisely placed in the time stream (Friedman, 1993; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). 
Both the client and the other entered the remembered interaction (area A in Fig. 1, the 
segment of the timelines between the event boundaries) on their own subjective timelines, 
each uniquely representing their previous direct experience of other situations and of one 
another. Depending on their skill as observers and the affordability of particular states, 
both the physical and subjective presences of each were afforded to the other, along with 
the sociocultural and temporal context of the event. In the Gibsonian model this would 
occur via structural and transformational invariants noticeable in their history of interac- 
tion. For example, if the young man saw his father appearing “crazy” as he approached (a 
possible reference to an affordance-further detail is needed for a sensory level descrip- 
tion), this determination may, or may not, have been revealed in a physical expression 
on the son’s face that, in turn, afforded some meaning to the father. Moreover, the direct 
perception of the event occurred within a specific space-time context that may have had 
important implications for what was perceived and how it was interpreted and recollected. 
Thus, the father may indeed have been perturbed with the son because of other recent 
events suggesting the son’s irresponsibility. However, his demeanor, rather than leading 
his son to an awareness of the problem, may have afforded certain actions, such as 
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avoidant noncompliance, but not others, such as apologizing. In this way the affordance 
concept draws our attention to the experience-action possibilities of a particular interper- 
sonal moment; such space-time localized events may involve rather specific and in some 
cases unique affordances for each participant, and these affordances constrain their ac- 
tions, both then and later, and any later interpretations they generate. 
The event can be thought of in terms of large or small time units (see Ginsburg & 
Smith, 1993; Newtson, Engquist, & Bois, 1977). The notion of affordance requires that 
there be invariance in the informational properties of the situation across time. Therefore, 
because time is continuous and ordered, the significant time units represented in a mem- 
ory narrative would need to be much smaller than they are typically if they are to precisely 
capture the relationship between various narrative elements and perceptual memory. In 
Fig. 1, this is indicated by the segmented bars of the affordance structures identified. 
Each segment represents a hypothetical statement about something recognized in the time 
stream. If it were possible to get descriptions of what each actor is thinking and perceiving 
moment to moment, as in thinking aloud procedures commonly used in cognition labora- 
tories (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1984), th en we would begin to approximate a definitive 
accounting of the perceptual material that constrains what can be said later about the 
event. Even more, one could imagine a videotape taken from the perspective of each 
actor, coordinated with an ongoing description of what is being perceived, as being a still 
closer representation of this material. All the details of such a sequence might not be of 
interest to a clinician and certainly an individual’s perspective does not capture the whole 
story of an event. Nonetheless, as this formulation makes clear, such detail exists necessarily 
in the flow of time, whether we successfully access it or not, and it may or may not be repre- 
sented in a narrative depending on the client’s ability and motivation to do so. 
Finally, the emphasis on continuity and order in the model reveals an ecological reality, 
directly germane to understanding a memory narrative, that the client could not possibly 
access and that will remain obscure if the clinician only investigates contemporary subjec- 
tivity in the client’s own terms-as is often seen as the sine qua non of good therapy. This 
reality, which is captured in the perspective of the omniscient observer, is centered in 
area A in Fig. 1, the temporal locus of affordance of the remembered event, where the 
client perceives the other event and the other perceives the client event. The extent to 
which this larger perspective could be perceived and interpreted at this time, depended 
on the client’s developmental level, observational skills, and perceptual learning in the 
interpersonal realm. Moreover, in the moment-to-moment stream of time, it depended 
on such mundane but ultimately determinative, phenomena as where attention was fo- 
cused, as in eyes looking to the floor or directly at the face of the other. We believe this 
perspective on the event, as placed within a continuous and ordered time stream, needs 
greater attention in memory inquiry. 
Before going on it is important to note that while Gibson (1979, 1986) was clear that 
social information is directly afforded in temporally extended social encounters, and there 
is data bearing on this matter (e.g., Runeson & Frykholm, 1983), he did not address the 
issue of the perception of subjectivity directly (cf. Heider, 1958). It is likely that apprehen- 
sion of subjectivity involves real time cognitive recognition processes (Neisser, 1991; 
Trierweiler, 1984)--s in the recognition of an instance of a linguistic category such as 
“disrespect”- as well as direct perception and retrospective attribution processes. None- 
theless, the point here is that both direct perception and recognition operate to some 
extent within a real time context, and therefore, they are both grounded in the informa- 
tional properties of the available affordance structure. We argue that knowledge of this 
affordance structure is essential to adequate understanding of all higher level interpreta- 
tions, including ongoing recognition processes. 
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Event Boundaries May be Unclear 
In addition to ambiguities in most narratives with respect to the microscopic details of 
interpersonal perception, there are ambiguities with respect to the larger event boundaries 
themselves. As noted above, event narratives imply temporal boundaries that are as often 
the result of linguistic convention as they are physical realities, even though perception is 
continuous (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). This practical bounding, while useful for 
communication, can give events an objective character that belies their underlying real 
time complexity. Ecological theory cautions us that the perceptual underpinnings of an 
event may not be well represented by linguistic convenience. To the extent perceptions of 
an event, as they were ordered in real time, were dependent on some prior experience of 
one or both actors, the temporal event boundaries initially revealed may be misleading. 
This is reflected in the use of dotted lines in Fig. 1. It suggests that clinicians would do 
well to stay open to the possibility that relevant event boundaries extend further into the 
past, and-for understanding how the narrative is framed (see below)-into the future, 
than may be initially apparent. 
Interpersonal Perception is Nonrepeatable 
Ecological theory makes clear how interpersonal perception is similar to, and different 
from, object perception, thereby revealing our dependence on language in interpreting 
the interpersonal realm. Whereas most object perceptions can be repeated in virtually 
isomorphic fashion-in effect making the perspective of an omniscient observer irrelevant 
to a basic understanding of the object-interpersonal events are strictly nonrepeatable 
and therefore they are often strictly personal (or intersubjective in a very limited sense). 
In the interpersonal context, time places severe limitations on the apprehension of infor- 
mation potentially afforded by the other, making it difficult to analyze the alternative 
possibilities an ambiguous interpersonal situation might present. The result is great po- 
tential for incomplete registration, and/or over generalization of available information (as 
in Neisser’s, 1976 schema theory), especially given developmental limitations and the 
emotional tone of the event. In addition, opportunities for sharing perceptions with 
others for purposes of consensual validation are inherently limited; several instances of 
recollection and interpretation may occur before a directly perceived event finally emerges 
a therapy narrative, often years after the fact. 
Memory Narratives are Affected by Intervening Events 
Because interpersonal events are largely nonrepeatable, they are often best comprehended 
after they have occurred (e.g., Heider, 1958), and recollections are the only means for 
event analysis and interpretation. Area B of Fig. 1 represents one or more conscious 
recollection events. Shortly after the event, the young man in our clinical vignette may 
have thought to himself “What’s the matter with my father? He’s crazy. ,” and many other 
things, while engaging in actions like crying, pouting, angry displays, and so on. Such 
reflections are limited by the competency level of the individual and are highly dependent 
on language skills (e.g., Nelson, 1993). For example, the son may not notice, as would an 
omniscient observer, that the father came into the situation grouchy and preoccupied 
with some earlier error of his own, and in the absence of this information, the son may 
have had no alternative but to take his father’s manner only as a comment on himself. 
In effect, each episode of conscious recollection involves (a) the directly perceived, 
episodic elements of the event, as recollected and (b) any linguistic interpretations gener- 
ated during and after the event. Still further interpretation is possible during each of these 
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recollections. It is useful to think of them as directly perceived internal events tied to the 
ongoing perception of the external world. Thus, if the son has gained new information 
(e.g., dad has an alcohol problem), or new interpretive skills (e.g., recognition that dad 
may be upset at himself for not raising the boy right), then new interpretations of the 
event are possible. Furthermore, if the recollection coincides with conversations with 
others, say friends, then these may also contribute to a revised memory. Cognitive 
and object relations based theories posit cognitive and emotional reasons that certain 
problematic views of situations are maintained (Safran & Segal, 1990; Westen, 1991). 
The ecological perspective adds a question about how such viewpoints are maintained in 
the context of the perceptual realities of events and whether they involve selection and/or 
distortion of information as the event unfolds, or after in reflective interpretation. 
Memory Narratives are Affected by the Interpersonal 
Circumstances Surrounding Their Production 
At area (C), the event is finally recollected in therapy, a setting where it can be analyzed 
systematically with the help of an expert. This recollection can involve both episodic and 
linguistic elements from the event itself and all previous recollections, as well as something 
new, the directly perceived aspects of the context of therapy. One important function of 
this therapeutic context is to facilitate attention to problematic event perceptions and 
interpretations thereby yielding more complete and realistic event narratives. 
This section of the model merits special attention in that all the processes described thus 
far are operative within the immediate context of the therapy. Interpersonal approaches 
have assumed that the relationship with the therapist influences both the production and 
content of memory narratives (e.g., Carson, 1969; Safran & Segal, 1990; Sullivan, 1953). 
In expanding this view, our model suggests that clinicians would benefit from careful 
reconstruction of even recent interpersonal events, within and proximal to the therapy, as 
well as more temporally remote events. Some interpersonal memories might be state 
dependent productions (e.g., Bower, 1981), where interpersonal conditions existing in 
the therapy lead to selective recall and description of past events. 
This has important implications for the recent controversy about therapeutic memory. 
In particular, this view demands a therapeutic stance characterized by openness to elabo- 
ration of the narrative and active attention to the inherent uncertainty pervading all 
interpretation of remembered experience. For example, what is the impact of a client 
perceiving the therapist to be most interested in particular forms of information, such as 
dreams or abuse memories? This might be a situation where the influences that worry 
Loftus are operative, as the client strives to cooperate with, or to resist, the therapist’s 
apparent interest. In contrast, if the intention of the therapist is to follow the model, 
directed as it is toward detailed elaboration of how a particular narrative relates to other 
narratives in the person’s life-including narrative about recent moments in the ther- 
apy - then such influences are less likely to perniciously affect the client’s understanding. 
At a still deeper level, transference and countertransference processes can be understood 
concretely in terms of the direct perception of the therapy event. Of course, clients can 
still fabricate and distort events, and therapists will continue to display interest, but there 
will be greater opportunity for both to understand the source and meaning of such 
distortions (or poorly understood elaboration) than typically exists in informal narratives. 
This is particularly true for the problematic narratives thought of as detailed, as in 
the eyewitness literature (Loftus, 1993) but that are interpreted separately from the 
interpersonal relationships that influence them. 
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The Event Information Universe and Its Interpretation in Real Time 
Before going on to some case illustrations, it is important to conceptualize, with greater 
precision, the information existing at the time of an event and of how this information 
comes to be represented later in a memory narrative. The model suggests that there are 
three possible categories of information available for linking a narrative to an event: 
The Realized Affordance Structure of the Event. The realized affordance structure is 
what the client experienced directly; it involves information directly afforded about the 
physical and subjective presences of self, other, and context as the event unfolded. This is 
the type of information typically referenced by clients as they attempt to provide details 
about events in the past. 
Recollection Information About the Event. This is information originating in the various 
recollections of the event, including both interpretations of the event and linguistic and 
episodic associations emergent in each recollection. It also includes information about the 
recollection events themselves that might pertain to one’s understanding of the original 
event. 
The Potential Affordance Structure of the Event. The potential affordance structure is a 
superset for the realized affordance structure. It includes unperceived information that 
would exist to an omniscient observer had one been present as the event unfolded. (Note 
that this is not necessarily a therapist’s eye view, via some theoretical account, because 
the low level information available to an omniscient observer can only be approximated.) 
This hypothetical observer would have a more complete “data set,” available for a variety 
of interpretive schemes, including psychological theory, than could either actor, even in 
principle. 
Ideally, we would know how each of these categories of information operates in the 
narrative construction process. Unfortunately, it is rarely possible to achieve this level of 
comprehension. It is important that clinicians be aware of the material restrictions, 
implied by the model, that can limit our understanding of how a client’s particular 
interpretations might have developed. 
Conceptualizing Affordance, Perception, and Recollection Using Set Theory 
The informational structure referenced in a memory narrative can be formally elaborated 
using tools from set theory. The first step is to conceptualize the potential affordance stature 
of the event as the universe of information that would, in principle, have been directly 
afforded to a hypothetical omniscient observer. If we allow that such an expert perspective 
would approximate a reasonably definitive account of the event, then let the information 
so obtained constitute the universe, U. Conceptually, U is the hypothetical class of 
directly affordable information about the event that includes only low level descriptions of 
basic actions, subjective states of each actor, and the context in which the event emerges 
in time. The temporal event boundaries would extend as far back from the time of the 
event as needed to grasp the information affordable in the event. Thus, for example, the 
assertive behavior of an actor may include some aspect of the individual’s prior history of 
skill development in this area. The time units comprising this information would be as 
small as needed to generate an adequate account of the structural and transformational 
invariants that make up the event, as determined by the circumstances of the investiga- 
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tion. Abstract interpretive information could also be part of U to the extent it is well 
linked to the realities of the emergent event. 
Note that the notion of such a U is not so far fetched as it may at first seem. Consider a 
group of observers who watch an event and discuss it as exhaustively as possible. To the 
extent such material approximates a complete account of everything that might be said 
about the event from a particular cultural/historical perspective, at a relatively how level 
of abstraction, then it approximates U. Of course, in most events of everyday life, U 
exists only in principle and the client’s perception of the event, the realized affordunce 
structure (E), is a subset of U. (The other’s perception of the event would also be part of U 
but would be entirely hypothetical except when the other is available to the therapy.) For 
reasons outlined above, E will seldom even approximate U in the natural course of an 
individual’s awareness; even those who are highly trained can scarcely grasp simultane- 
ously the perceptions of both self and other as they unfold, without considerable post hoc 
reflection. 
E is interpreted and its meaning transformed in time by subsequent acts of recollection 
(R,). Each recollection may, or may not, capture some informational aspect of E, or a 
previous R, (cf. Bartlett, 1932). As with E in relation to U, a given R, would rarely be 
equivalent to E, and rarely would a R, + 1 be equivalent to R,. Interpersonal events are 
inherently difficult to specify in a definitive fashion and few events in our lives are 
subjected to extensive scrutiny. Therefore, these successive nonequivalencies make it 
difficult to identify E with precision. Indeed, each R,, emergent in psychotherapy-which 
can be designated as RT, (recollection in therapy) in recognition of its special status- 
directly represents information of three types relative to E: (a) information directly given 
at the time of the event and that represents a subset of E; (b) information implicationally 
related to RT,, be it linguistic or episodic in nature (that is, that subset of RT, not 
intersecting E); (c) if m > 1 and/or t > 1, the intersection of the current RT, with all 
previous R, and RT,. 
An important implication of this line of thought is that there is considerable complexity 
involved in the accretion of information about E over time, both in terms of private 
recollections and those discussed with others, including discussions in psychotherapy. Set 
notation, using the concepts of intersection (n), union (U), and negation (-) (see 
Kerlinger, 1986), vividly illustrates this complexity even with minimal assumptions about 
successive information intersections between recollections. Each R consists of a portion 
that directly maps E (i.e., R Il E), and a portion that does not directly map E (i.e., R fl 
-E; in words: “R intersection not-E.“). Similarly, each successive R maps some portion 
of each previous R as well as potentially offering something completely new. Thus, as just 
described, the remembrance of an event might look like this: 
R, = (R, nE) U (Rln -E); 
R, = (R, Il (E U R,)) U (R, I-l -(E U R,)); 
RT, = (RT, Il (E U R, U R2)) U (RT, n -(E U R, U RJ) 
More generally, for a current recollection in a therapy session (RT,) with m previous 
everyday recollection events and t - 1 previous recollection events in therapy: 
RT, = (RT, fl (E U R, U R, U . U R, U RT, U RT, U . . U RT, _ J) 
U(RT, f-l - (E U R, U Rz U . U R, U RT, U RT, U U RT, _ J) 
In specific circumstances, if successive recollections did not interlink so neatly as repre- 
sented here, the complexity of the description might further increase. The impacts of 
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these various intersections are impossible to discern in detail even with small m’s and t’~. 
Nonetheless, they can affect current recollections in unknown ways that may be important 
to the work (e.g., as can be readily observed with clients who have already extensively 
analyzed a memory using various theories and/or who have participated in numerous 
previous theory-driven therapy sessions). It is easy to stray away from the informational 
foundation of E, especially given the common interpersonal goal of discussing E in a 
fashion that is socially acceptable, as defined within the situation of producing the narra- 
tive. By implication, an important goal for cognitive-interpersonal therapy is not only to 
expand the extent to which a current RT, accurately maps E but also to distinguish 
this informational intersection from intersections with other R, and RT,- in effect to 
distinguish direct perceptions from interpretations of direct perceptions and interpreta- 
tions of interpretations (cf. Sullivan, 1953, on the symbol-sign distinction). In so doing, 
the intent is to help the client become aware of how the perceived event relates to a 
current understanding of self that has been developing over a lifetime of direct experience 
of self and others. 
Additionally, it may be desirable to improve the extent to which subsequent R, and 
RT, map both E and U, as opposed to adding new information. As presented in the set 
equation above, we are assuming that each successive R, or RT, maps some aspect of U. 
Obviously, this need not be the case in that new interpretations of recollected events can 
reflect associations to other events, in which case R’s might overlap the boundaries of U, 
relating to U’s associated with other events. One advantage of this set theoretical formal- 
ization is that it reveals the potential for such ambiguity in references to real events. 
CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 
This approach is a heuristic for clinical investigation of interpersonal memories. When an 
event meriting analysis comes up in therapy, the problem is one of mapping the various 
components of the narrative report onto the model, thereby organizing them, discovering 
gaps, and identifying their concrete meaning and source. Technically, this is similar to 
approaches described by Greenberg and Safran (1981) and Toukmanian (1986) in which 
the clinician, via a focused interview, pursues perceptual level detail. Here, however, we 
also present an organizing framework as a guide to the type of information to be pursued. 
This involves: (a) specific inquiry into the physical/temporal event boundaries; (b) estab- 
lishing the sequence of any mentioned sub-events; (c) establishing how descriptive words 
or phrases used in the communication with the therapist are related to directly perceived, 
low level, event information (E) or to later recollections and interpretations of the event 
(R,); (d) identifying any important R, (or RT,) as events in their own right that might 
influence the ways the client interprets the event; (e) developing concrete narrative de- 
scriptions of the physical and subjective presences of the client and other in relatively 
small temporal units, thereby approximating, the realized and potential affordance struc- 
ture of the event; (f) developing an understanding how material selected in presenting the 
narrative relates to current interpersonal relationships and situations. 
To these ends, it is important to guide the client to talk in terms of what was seen, 
heard, and felt; to conceive of the event as a real time sequence and to identify the 
personally relevant beginning and end even though they may not be obvious at first; to 
become aware of thoughts and feelings that occurred after the event that might be impor- 
tant in understanding it in the therapy; to describe elements of the sequence, emphasizing 
self, other, and context, in perceptual level terminology. Furthermore, client and thera- 
pist collaborate to specify the potential affordance structure of the event in concrete terms 
(including things that might have been but were not directly perceived by the client). A 
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major part of this involves speculation about what the other might have been experiencing 
in the context of his/her immediate and extended past and future. 
It should be emphasized that his approach is much more focused on the concrete 
perceptual underpinnings and limits of interpersonal events, on identifying how percep- 
tual detail is mapped into verbal narratives, and on how narratives are generated and 
transformed in an ongoing interpersonal context, than are most accounts of clinical 
inquiry (e.g., MacKinnon & Michels, 1971; Sullivan, 1954). Clinicians often accept 
information, especially about seemingly concrete detail, as initially given in a narrative 
without pursuing perceptual level detail-particularly without seeking greater clarity 
about exactly how a person or object was perceived in the time stream. Furthermore, 
even when the realized affordance structure of the event is described by especially verbal 
clients, the potential affordance structure, including the perceptions of the other, is often 
ignored or taken as given without rigorous inquiry. Our experience shows that perceptual 
detail can be actively pursued without disrupting the therapeutic alliance-nor even a 
client-centered approach, for that matter (see also Rice, 1984)-and that doing so in 
conjunction with active, open attempts to model the real time circumstances of the event, 
actually enhances the relationship. Such an approach can also increase the clarity of 
ultimate event recall and description, the client’s recognition of linkages to other relevant 
material, and the client’s understanding of more general identifications of schema, inter- 
personal style, and associations to current concerns. Thus, the model points to interper- 
sonal information directly germane to the client’s own attempts to generate a personally 
realistic narrative in the therapy, that is, at the same time, highly relevant to the clini- 
cian’s case formulation, including formulations bearing on transference and countertrans- 
ference issues. 
Once reasonably clear information is obtained, clinician and client can work together 
to analyze the plausibility of various interpretations with respect to the directly perceived 
event (E), the surrounding potential affordance structure (U), and the source of the 
interpretation (e.g., interpretations coming from self, friends, a particular perspective, 
and so on). Interpretations can be evaluated against a detailed data source clearly 
grounded in the client’s own experience. The ways the interpretations themselves were 
constructed can be evaluated and placed in life context (e.g., more general interpersonal 
themes). But, perhaps most powerfully, the clinician can hypothesize with the client about 
details of the model not necessarily accessible in the recollected data that may inform how 
the event unfolded (e.g., the subjective experience of the other, or the manner in which a 
systems level phenomenon was operating in time). This way, clients often recognize how 
they have misconstrued an event (e.g., the intention of the other) more quickly than if we 
had not engaged with them in speculation about what the other person might have been 
perceiving. 
Case lllustra tions 
The cases that follow are intended only to illustrate our current thinking about how this 
model might be applied, in reasonable fashion, to the investigation of clinically relevant 
interpersonal memories. They should not be considered confirmatory of the model, nor 
definitive from a technical standpoint. 
In the first case, careful explorations of subunits of an event reveals how an existing 
interpretation is misleading the individual, thereby facilitating a discussion of links to 
interpersonal themes from the past. 
A 28-year-old professional woman sought therapy because she felt ‘over-reactive and out of 
control.” In her eighth session, she recollected an incident that she felt illustrated her over 
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reactivity. A few days previously she had received notice that her supervisor was displeased 
with her handling of a crisis at work and wanted to meet with her. She recalled becoming 
“extremely anxious even though I knew I handled the crisis well.” She called a friend, but felt 
frustrated after the call: her friend could be critical and patronizing and their talk had not 
helped. When she met with the supervisor, she was calm, but could recall little of the 
conversation. Immediately after the meeting she felt “restless, dependent, irritable, spacey,” 
a condition that persisted for two days during which she frantically cleaned house. 
The therapist, in following the model, asked the client to conceptualize the sequence of the 
event as if it were a videotape. The “tape” began with the details of the notification of a 
meeting with the supervisor. This came by phone, in the context of a flurry of conversation 
among office staff about the crisis. His expression of unhappiness with the events of the crisis 
(an affordance) was directly perceived to be displeasure with the client’s performance. She 
described her anxiety on receipt of this message and her “restlessness, pacing, sweaty palms, 
racing heartbeat, and a sense of numbness and confusion.” 
She was then invited to hear the words of her conversation with her friend and to experience 
the sound of her friend’s voice and her reaction to it. She recollected feeling unsupported as her 
friend offered a view of the crisis. She recalled feeling that she wanted to please her friend at the 
same time she was angry with her. Following the phone conversation, she paced around the 
room rehearsing possible responses to the supervisor’s criticism. As she came to the beginning 
of the meeting, she stated that she could not recall anything of the next 20 minutes. 
The therapist asked what the event was like in terms of low level perceptual detail, like 
what she saw, the way the room looked, and so on. The client readily recollected entering 
the room, shaking hands with her supervisor, where each sat, the color of his tie, and that he 
took notes. In so doing, she suddenly became aware of what he had said, recognizing 
immediately that he had not been angry with her at all but rather concerned with misinfor- 
mation he had received from another source. He concluded that she had handled the situa- 
tion well. She wondered aloud why she had not remembered this conversation, and thereafter 
her hesitancy about recollecting the situation disappeared. 
She drove home intending to be with her spouse, but instead she avoided him by cleaning 
and doing laundry. As she described this, she became visibly anxious. The therapist asked, 
“Has there ever been another time you have felt like this?” Her response was immediate and 
animated: “Oh yes! Every time my father beat me.” This led to an extended and very open 
discussion of times her mother accused her of doing something wrong, of how she handled 
her father’s severe physical discipline, and of how she often cleaned and did chores trying to 
win her mother’s comfort and forgiveness. She readily recognized the link between the 
supervisor, family events, and feelings she had on occasion in the therapy. This understand- 
ing made her feel less “crazy” and anxious and she began to examine her “overreactions” in 
the context of her prior interpersonal learning. 
In this example, the pursuit of low level perceptual detail of a temporally proximal 
interpersonal event facilitated the opening up of what could have been a highly ambiguous 
clinical situation, thus revealing a characteristic way of responding to a particular event 
configuration. We have found this often to be the case, even when complete details of the 
model are not pursued exhaustively. Table 1 shows how the subunits of this event can be 
organized in terms of the model. The entries in the Table represent an attempt to be as 
concrete and perceptual as possible (within the confines of space). Obviously the informa- 
tion could be pursued in much greater detail. Usually, however, even incomplete infor- 
mation moves the narrative forward. As Table 1 shows, recollections are often inconsis- 
tent with plausible representations of the interaction, and comprehending the event 
involves the unfulfilled wish for comfort from the friend, and later her spouse, and the 
unrecollected praise from the supervisor, both of which require a different interpretation 
of the interaction than the client had previously developed. In turn, similar themes could 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































320 S. J. Trierweiler and C. M. Donovan 
not known, revealing precisely how information is assumed in recollection (RT, that may 
not be accurate (Bonanno, 1990; Safran & Segal, 1990). 
In the following illustration, secondary recollections and accompanying interpretations 
(R, and RT,) led the client away from the interpersonal implications of an experience. 
A woman, with history of episodes of depression, described a recent event that seemed 
related to her current depressed and anxious mood. Depression, confusion, and “craziness” 
had pervaded her week. These feelings were accompanied by disrupted sleep and fears that 
she was getting ill and would require hospitalization. These feelings began midweek, during 
an evening at her new boyfriend’s house. She was uncertain where the relationship was 
going, but could identify nothing in particular that had precipitated her ill feelings. The 
therapist noted that she seemed generally concerned about her current condition (an example 
of an interpretive recollection (R,), and she could see nothing about her interactions that 
was relevant. 
Nonetheless, she agreed to examine the onset of the feelings in greater detail (i.e., to 
explore E as distinguished from R,). The event of visiting the boyfriend was conceptualized 
in terms of Fig. 1. She was asked to describe in detail getting to the boyfriend’s house with 
particular attention to what she saw and felt. She described getting to the house very late and 
being disappointed that the promised dinner was still in the early stages of preparation. She 
was very hungry, but excited enough about the visit that she ignored the inconvenience. She 
described entering the kitchen and sitting at the table while the boyfriend proceeded with the 
preparations. At this point, she recalled having fears about her mental health and intrusive 
thoughts about hospitalization. These thoughts seemed related to her depression: The boy- 
friend seemed light and happy, and this made it seem all the more likely that she was “crazy.” 
As she became increasingly anxious, the therapist gently asked that she recollect the event in 
even greater detail by describing what she looked at as she sat at the table. She described 
looking at the clock and noting the late hour, noting her hunger again, then watching her 
boyfriend preparing a stirfry. The therapist asked what she saw. The client said, “cauli- 
fl ower.” As she did so, she smiled recognizing that as she looked at the cauliflower (an 
affordance) she had experienced surprise; it was not something she would put in a stirfry. 
She recalled fading out of the conversation and ruminating about how different the boyfriend 
was, asking herself what she was doing with him, and was she making a correct choice. How 
could she make correct choices given her history depression and unsatisfying relationships, 
and would this lead her back into a depression and the hospital? 
This material led directly to a discussion of how this boyfriend fit into her ongoing 
concerns about relationships and her uncertainty about her judgment in these matters. These 
concerns were explored over the next several sessions and linked to further details in her 
interactions with men and to already explored information about traumatic experiences years 
earlier. 
In both of these cases, the exploration of perceptual detail and interpersonal context, 
moved the client beyond self-limiting narratives about feeling crazy toward an active 
exploration of issues in relationships. This happened readily as the therapist pursued 
the model. We could elaborate numerous additional examples in which an ambiguous 
therapeutic moment is clarified by careful examination of the affordance structure of an 
event, including events in the therapy itself. We have found the model useful for the 
exploration of temporally remote memories, which individuals often experience with 
perceptual qualities, as has been well documented (e.g., Bartlett, 1932); for elaboration 
of proximal and distal memories that emerge in couples and family treatment; and for 
assisting the process of understanding descriptions of highly emotionally charged events 
in a client’s current life, such as angry fights between parents and children. 
Finally, although it is often difficult for individuals to recollect specific incidents of 
recollecting remote events (recollecting recollections), it is important to examine the 
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influence of these secondary episodes, such as they are available, on later recollections in 
therapy. For example, in the case of the young man spilling the can of paint in the pickup 
truck, outlined above, exploration of prior discussions with friends about the incident 
revealed how some of his current views of his father were constrained by views expressed 
by his friends about their own fathers. This facilitated an examination of a plausible 
representation of the father’s perspective in the paint can event that, in turn, led to a 
discussion of how the young man’s own frequent, noncompliant attitude might have 
played a role both in the event and in more current relationships. 
DISCUSSION 
We present a framework for inquiry into the ecological foundations of specific interper- 
sonal memories. It outlines a thought experiment to be conducted each time an interper- 
sonal memory comes up in therapy. We argue that the results of such an inquiry provide 
a strong database from which to conduct cognitive-interpersonal psychotherapy in the 
tradition of clinical theorists such as Sullivan and Carson. Such information is particularly 
compatible with therapies that investigate problematic interpersonal schema (e.g., Green- 
berg & Safran, 1981; Rice, 1984; Safran & Segal, 1990), problematic configurations of 
interpersonal experience such as nuclear scripts (see Bonanno, 1990), and narrative 
schema (Russell & van den Broek, 1992). 
Empirical Support: What About the Fallibility of Memory? 
It is important to note that all the well-documented problems of autobiographical memory 
pertain to this approach (e.g., Loftus, 1993; Ross & Conway, 1986). Applying the model 
offers no insurance, in itself, that the understanding of events so obtained is definitive 
from some external standpoint. Rather, the framework is a cueing device that invites 
inquiry into the perceptual specifics relevant to an interpersonal interaction and that 
focuses reconstructive processes on the low level episodic elements of memory (see 
Brewer, 1986). Obviously, there remains considerable ambiguity and uncertainty in this 
process. Still, the promise of this approach lies in the fact that the inquiry is guided by an 
adequate reference model, rather than the implicit understandings of a particular clini- 
cian. Also, as mentioned earlier, evidence is emerging that some of the problems with 
memory inquiry may be overstated, being more a function of inadequate memory investi- 
gation strategies than problems in remembering. For example, guided memory practices 
(e.g., Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985), 
even less focused than our proposal, enhance accuracy of remembered detail in eyewitness 
situations. Research will be needed to clarify this problem in psychotherapeutic contexts. 
Until then, our experience suggests the approach facilitates the inquiry as evidenced in: 
(a) new details that are cued, (b) the emergence and discussion of new events that 
contribute to the larger narrative within which specific events are nested (Neisser, 1986), 
(c) the readiness with which clients accept alternative views consistent with the data, and 
with which they expand the account, and (d) the effectiveness of interpretations of the 
impacts of interpersonal style in the context of such grounded data. 
Indirect empirical support for the assumptions underlying the model lie in three general 
categories. First, Gibsonian perception theory is based in a long tradition of experimental 
work and successful applications in domains such as aviation (Gibson, 1979, 1986; Reed, 
1988) and, more recently, to research in social perception (e..g, Ginsburg & Smith, 
1993; Valenti & Good, 1991; Van Acker & Valenti, 1989). Second, the representation is 
consistent with current views of naturalistic memory (e.g., Cohen, 1989). The notion that 
memories map events having a clear beginning and end points is well established in 
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experimental studies. Third, recent work in social cognition (see also Westen, 1991) is 
relevant including work on category accessibility (Srull & Wyer, 1980), on-line cognition 
(Bassili, 1989), and content-specificity in social cognition (Smith, 1990). 
lmplica tions 
Several caveats are in order. Memory inquiry is not all there is to cognitive-interpersonal 
therapy. There are numerous surrounding issues that have not been addressed herein, 
such as how to select memories for extensive analysis, how to develop schematic interpre- 
tations for mapping onto memory data, and so on. This framework is intended only to 
encourage clinicians to pursue temporally organized perceptual information rigorously in 
their inquiry (cf. Brack, Brack, & Zucker, 1992). Also, we wish to reiterate that our case 
illustrations should not be taken to imply strong confirmation of the model, nor that the 
approach we have developed thus far always yields dramatic results. As in all therapeutic 
endeavors, much depends on the therapeutic relationship and the skill of the therapist in 
developing and maintaining a productive alliance with the client. 
Loftus’ (1993) concerns about the authenticity of some memory narratives in psycho- 
therapy merit special comment in light of this model. Our model is essentially construc- 
tionist (e.g., Gergen, 1985): it is an explicit framework for exploring what clients know, 
or think they know, and for constructing narratives that take this knowledge into account 
in as comprehensive a fashion as possible. However, as is implied throughout this article, 
an active constructive process should not be confused with an epistemological position 
that denies the existence of some reality external to a particular observer. We believe that 
there are ecological foundations for many (not all) of the important memory narratives 
arising in the course of psychotherapy; in this sense our philosophical position is more 
akin to Gibson’s (see Reed, 1988), or in recent philosophy, Bhaskar (1978), or Manicas 
and Secord (1983). Still, there is no way of knowing whether a particular narrative is 
definitive when viewed from some external perspective or in light of some other ideal 
standard. Questions about the extent to which we attain the ideal in a particular inquiry, 
to which it is indeed attainable, and to which such narratives prove to be clinically useful, 
cannot be answered within the model itself. By the same token, our formulation should 
not be considered a solution to the problems being examined in the eyewitness memory 
literature, where an essential interpersonal context for framing the narrative is the 
courts - including the narrative testimony produced by a therapist referencing the content 
of a previous conversation with a client about an event in the client’s past. Research will 
be needed to clarify these issues. 
The problem of accuracy in memory narratives is not simple for clinicians. It is a 
matter of relative plausibility and relevance of a particular narrative formulation, to both 
client and therapist, within the context of the therapeutic relationship. Knowing detail, in 
itself, is no assurance of an accurate portrayal. But not using focused inquiry to examine 
detail and its relationship to the larger stream of interpersonal experience, virtually 
assures that understanding is limited. If, as Loftus discusses, an abuse memory comes 
into being primarily as a function of reading a book, then knowing that the event of reading 
is an important part of the narrative being told is essential to understanding the telling. This 
would be true whether or not the abuse event referenced is true, by some ultimate standard. 
In this view, all memory narratives, and particularly those of a dramatic nature, involve 
distinct interpersonal circumstances that are important to the treatment. 
Our model, and evidence for the state dependency of memory (Bower, 1981), suggest 
that the attitude of the clinician is important to all memory inquiry. Steps should be taken 
to avoid premature foreclosure on the examination of an event and the variety of ways it 
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might be experienced by a client. An important advantage of an emphasis on the afford- 
ante structure of the event-as it is remembered and described in the context of an 
affordance structure existing in a therapeutic interaction- is that it helps communicate to 
clients the importance of their own sense of the reality of their experience in the past and 
in the present. In our view, this stance is both critical to successful implementation of the 
model, and consistent with the current research concerning memory. 
Despite these concerns, therapists who follow the model may be able to develop more 
grounded and comprehensive interpretations of remembered events (e.g., Bucci, 1989). 
In so doing, particular perspectives on the events are likely to be seen as more plausible 
than others, within the context of the therapeutic relationship. Nonetheless, clinicians 
need to remain cautious in communicating certainty about memory narratives even in 
the advanced stages of a therapy. Our model suggests that such assertions are powerful 
interventions that could inappropriately constrain the development of a more complete 
understanding of the referenced events. Therefore, they should be treated with as much 
care as any clinical intervention. At the same time, this caution needs to be balanced by 
appropriate respect for the client’s own sense of the authenticity of personal experience. If 
a client chooses to view a memory as meaning something particular for her life, or as 
having been repressed, then the interpersonal consequences of this belief, which can be 
substantial, can be addressed in the therapy even though there is no formal way for a 
clinician to establish the definitive meaning, or fact of the repression, one way or the 
other. We have discovered that situations wherein psychological defenses seem to be 
operative, can often be seen in terms of more benign attention and selection processes 
in narrative construction when the complete temporal context of the event is carefully 
considered. Research will be required to determine if this approach actually is useful in 
ruling out the repression hypothesis. 
CONCLUSION 
This approach facilitates the overarching goal in interpersonal therapy of uncovering and 
working with interpersonal patterns emergent within the therapeutic relationship (e.g., 
Carson, 1969; Kiesler, 1982; Safran & Segal, 1990; Singer, 1988). Problematic aspects of 
therapeutic interactions often disappear as the client feels more understood and in control 
of the information of his or her past. In turn, more central, transferential aspects of these 
interactions are revealed in sharp relief, and more specific information is available to the 
clinician to reference these hidden aspects of interpersonal style. 
Several areas of research are suggested by the model, including studies of real time 
interpersonal perceptions and their transformation later in memory, studies of the effects 
of training in the use of the model on memory narratives referencing independently 
verifiable events, and studies of the implicit frameworks governing memory inquiry 
already in use in the psychotherapy community. 
It is quite likely that many therapists already do something like this in their memory 
inquiries. For them, this model offers one comprehensive framework for understanding 
that work, and, in particular, for reminding them about what they can and cannot know 
of the material experience of their clients. For others, this model provides reasons for 
seeking greater perceptual detail in memory narratives that are consistent with recent 
thinking about narrative (e.g., Russell & van den Broek, 1992), social construction 
processes (e.g., Mahoney, 1991), and even the construction of time in memory (Brack, 
Brack, & Zucker, 1992; Friedman, 1993). We believe that more such models are needed 
in the clinical literature, bridging the gap between inadequate notions of objectivity and 
beliefs about the complete fluidity of social construction. Additionally, the model can be 
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thought of as one conceptual guide for therapists who wish to improve the evidentiary 
basis of their work. Trierweiler and Stricker (1991) have called such evidence based 
inquiry, which attempts to approximate the fundamental details of local circumstances, 
local clinical science. We believe that clinical endeavors will be improved when all thera- 
pists become clearer about the evidence supporting clinical formulations, however fallible 
it might be. This approach to psychotherapeutic memories offers one means by which this 
can be accomplished. 
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